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Abstract 
 
Despite a peak in activism against climate change in the UK, new environmental direct action 
networks have not yet received much academic attention. This article takes as a case study 
perhaps the most prominent of such networks – the Camp for Climate Action – which held 
several high-profile protest events between 2006 and 2011. Using a theoretical framework 
which understands society as being distinctly ‘post-political’ in character, we ask questions 
about the knowledge claims that form the foundations of radical environmental politics. 
Drawing on published statements and press releases, as well as from our insights as active 
participants in the Camp, we analyse the strategy of environmental protest where climate 
change has become its focus. The Camp for Climate Action was a contested political arena. 
We argue that this contestation existed over the Camp’s strategy in the context of a 
‘scientised’, ‘post-political’ politics which operated within an ethical framework that 
prescribed individual responsibility as the primary basis for action. 
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In the UK, the period between 2006 and 2011 witnessed a wave of environmental direct action 
centred on the Camp for Climate Action (CCA). Spurred by the lack of national and international 
political commitment to tackling climate change despite the urgent warnings of the scientific 
community, ‘Climate Campers’ took action against a variety of different targets at annual protest 
camps and other direct action events. This took place against a background of the increasing 
‘post-politicisation’ of climate governance. Drawing on the work of theorists such as Alain 
Badiou, Jacques Rancière and Erik Swyngedouw, this article considers the unique set of 
constraints imposed by the post-political condition and the strategic responses which this drew 
from the activists. 
We argue that the statements, debates and strategies associated with the CCA reveal that 
its moral and ethical principles were derived not so much from political positions as from a post-
political understanding of the science of climate change. Though situated in a radical 
environmentalist discourse, these principles frequently clashed with the more overtly political, 
and often anarchist, ethics that were integral to the direct action movement against climate 
change. 
Social movements, including environmental movements, advance alternative “knowledge 
interests” into the public arena (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, Jamison 2001). We offer some 
reflections on the claims of knowledge as advanced by activists within the CCA and associated 
groups. These claims, as well as their communication to movement sympathisers and the wider 
public are essential as strategic guides to action. We analyse the strategy debates within the 
Camp as a dynamic process, just as identity formation within social movements is always in flux 
(Melucci 1986, 1996). Regarding processes of contestation within movements, some have 
pointed to the relevance of Bourdieu’s theory of practice and ‘fields’ (Bourdieu 1977, 1992, 
Crossley 2002, pp. 168-191). In this case, we can describe a contested movement field in which 
there is an increasing tendency to base strategy upon science rather than political ideologies. 
While not framed in Bourdieu’s terms, Saunders and Price (2009) and Schlembach (2011) have 
already analysed the CCA as a ‘contested space’ where different perspectives compete with each 
other. Our paper follows this analysis. 
The research presented here derives from the authors’ extensive engagement with 
environmental politics and active, observant participation at successive CCAs. Between us we 
attended all yearly camps and major CCA protests and frequently participated in their 
organisation, both on national and local levels. During the camps we were activists first and 
researchers second. We now draw upon extensive field notes, meetings and workshop reports, 
and countless informal discussions with climate activists. We both organised and participated in 
several large political discussion plenaries and workshops, addressing topics relevant to this 
article. In addition, we have undertaken an extensive analysis of CCA literature, from press 
releases and public statements to banners and pamphlets. Although the CCA was a stand-alone 
organisation, it was composed of activists from across the UK and as such overlapped with other 
environmental protest organisations, such as the anti-aviation direct action group Plane Stupid, 
and Climate Rush. Therefore, we occasionally extend our analysis to other relevant groups.  
This article is structured around three sections. Firstly, we analyse the CCA’s focus on 
carbon and rhetoric of urgency in a post-political framework. We take post-politics to mean a set 
of constraints that prevents any fundamental social criticism to flourish. It describes how 
alternatives to environmental governance are conceived as technical rather than political. 
Secondly we focus on the mobilisation of scientific rhetoric to support and ultimately direct 
political strategy. We relate this directly to the post-political dilemma. The promotion of a 
consensus around official climate science sought by some CCA activists here threatens to 
become a substitute for an agonistic, political perspective. Lastly, we explore the emphasis on 
‘personal responsibility’ as a driver of social change. Our analysis suggests that while there was 
strength in the movement’s invocation of science and ‘pragmatic’ political rationality, there was 
simultaneously a weakness in political vision. This section argues that a post-political approach 
to climate protest closes possibilities of political action that go beyond individual lifestyle 
choices and moral consumer behaviour. Within the CCA, this led to contestation over the ‘right’ 
strategy for challenging the root cause of climate change.  
 
The Camp for Climate Action  
 
There are a handful of academic articles studying the CCA. Authors have examined knowledge 
transfer between generations of activists and the adoption of direct action tactics (Plows 2008), 
The CCA’s form as a contested space (Saunders and Price 2009), its utopianism (Skrimshire 
2008), its relationship with climate science (Bowman 2010), and the negotiation of its 
environmental and social dimensions (Schlembach 2011). Additionally, a Political Studies 
Association paper (Saunders 2010) and a participant’s PhD thesis (Woodsworth 2008) consider 
the complexities of movement growth. This contrasts with the relative wealth of research on 
earlier environmental protest cycles (e.g. Doherty 1999, Seel et al. 2000, Plows 2003, Rootes 
2003). 
As mentioned, we understand the CCA not as a unified organisation, but as a 
convergence of groups and individuals using direct action and non-hierarchical practices against 
‘the root causes of climate change’. They are distinguishable from mainstream environmental 
NGOs by their methods, but also represent a distinct generation of activists that do not 
necessarily share the perspectives of the 1990s anti-roads or anti-GM campaigns.  
The CCA ran annually between 2006 and 2010, attracting thousands of young 
campaigners and unprecedented media coverage. It presented itself as being organised around 
three aims – ‘low-impact living, education and high-impact direct action’ – and functioned as a 
base for mass direct action. An extensive programme of workshops and debates facilitated 
networking and strategising, while an impressive logistical operation provided a working  
example of low-impact and non-hierarchical living. The CCA was variably located outside the 
coal-fired power-stations of Drax (2006) and Kingsnorth (2008), Heathrow airport (2007), the 
London carbon exchange (2009) and the Royal Bank of Scotland’s Edinburgh headquarters 
(2010). It disbanded in 2011 to “allow new tactics, organising methods and processes to emerge 
in this time of whirlwind change” (CCA 2011). Skrimshire (2008, p. 14) rightly asks what an 
analysis of the “most confrontational of a new wave of ‘climate action’ groups” could reveal 
about contemporary environmentalism. The attempted synergy between ‘small action’ models of 
sustainability and antagonistic collective action, he argues, represents a “significant shift in 
emphases on the function of activism in civil society” (ibid.). 
We go a step further and locate the epistemological basis of the CCA’s politics in a 
strong affiliation to ‘official’ climate science, the perceived urgency of the task, and a moral 
framework stressing individual responsibility; though we are particularly interested in how such 
knowledge claims were contested. 
 
Climate action and (post-)politics 
 
We agree with Catney and Doyle’s argument that climate change debates have become part of 
a “broader process of ‘post-politicisation’” (Catney and Doyle 2011, p. 178). Although there is 
debate as to what constitutes both the political and the post-political (Valentine 2005), points of 
agreement provide a useful lens through which to view the politics of climate change.  The post-
political context has emerged from the seeming exhaustion of all political models besides liberal 
capitalism, producing a condition in which antagonistic politics is being replaced by consensual 
governance (Crouch 2004, Badiou 2005, Laclau 2005, Rancière 2007, Zizek 1999). The 
parameters for this consensus  
 
[have] been built around the inevitability of neo-liberal capitalism as an economic 
system, parliamentary democracy as the political ideal, humanitarianism and inclusive 
cosmopolitanism as a moral foundation (Swyngedouw 2008, p. 19). 
 
Politics, defined as the contest between competing visions of society (Badiou 2005), has become 
synonymous with management of the status quo by experts and bureaucrats (Rancière 2007). 
Political projects diverging from this vision are represented as naive at best and political 
antagonism organised around the poles of left and right as archaic. Political parties have 
converged around a new political centre (Crouch 2004, Rancière 2007, p. 5) 
This does not mean that politics has been eliminated. Rather, political decisions are 
masked. Nor has political resistance to liberal capitalism disappeared. However, resistance is 
either categorised as unrealistic and dismissed as dangerous and deserving of repression, or it is 
translated into ‘pragmatic’ policy demands. Antagonisms are treated in isolation: relevant 
‘stakeholders’ are identified, knowledge claims vetted for acceptability, and an instrumental 
rather than political consensus is sought. Thus post-political governance actively insulates 
contemporary political economy from systemic critique. This creates a specific set of challenges 
for anti-systemic social movements.  
An awareness of post-political processes is analytically useful when it comes to the 
politics of climate change (Catney and Doyle 2011). The (post-)politics of climate change are 
played out through the ‘fetishisation of carbon dioxide’ – representing the build up of carbon in 
the atmosphere, not the economic processes which produce it, as the source of the problem 
(Swyngedouw 2008). Solutions stemming from this analysis are, therefore, based around 
technological and market methods to manage carbon emissions (Lohmann 2008, Swyngedouw 
2008). A ‘carbon consensus’ has emerged around the need to reduce carbon production within 
the existing capitalist framework (Pusey and Russell 2010). 
At first glance the CCA was one of the most antagonistic and openly anti-capitalist social 
movements in the UK in recent decades and a direct challenge to this ‘carbon consensus’. 
However, building on previous work by Saunders and Price (2009) and Schlembach (2011) we 
argue that it was a contested space in which tensions within the post-political condition 
interacted with more radical political tendencies.  
The choice of the CCA locations reflected a prioritisation of carbon over capital. As a 
striking example, at the 2009 Climate Camp in London, the destination for the ‘Climate Swoop’, 
a mass direct action attempting to occupy a coal fired power station, was put to a public vote. 
The key information presented to voters concerned the size of the company involved and the 
annual carbon emissions of each target. Other criteria were not presented. Although questions of 
economic power were continuously raised in the Climate Camp literature, and capitalist 
production processes were identified as the ‘root cause’ of climate catastrophe by many, social 
and political criteria were often eclipsed from the more pragmatic and concrete choices for 
strategic action of the CCA. Once occupied, the CCAs became sites of heated debate over 
strategies for dealing with climate change. A recent article analysing these debates (Schlembach 
2011) shows how different political priorities within the Camp were negotiated to include both 
environmental and social strategies within the climate change discourse. In contrast to the 
outward facing anti-capitalism, many debates focused on rather less radical measures including 
green taxes, population control and state-imposed consumption restrictions (see for example 
Charsley 2007, Abbott 2009).  
One of the reasons why these arguments had such traction within an outwardly anti-
capitalist and anti-authoritarian space stems from the unique qualities of climate change as a 
social movement ‘issue’ and a matter of ‘urgency’. The trumping of politics by climate 
temporality was best demonstrated by the different perspectives towards government and the 
state within the Camp. At the 2009 Blackheath CCA, one of the best attended and hotly 
contested plenary sessions was a discussion about the movement’s relationship to the state, 
making clear the divisions within the Camp on this subject, with many claiming that green taxes, 
at the least, would be required to solve the climate crisis in time (Abbott 2009). Many CCA 
activists argued that with the likelihood of climatic ‘tipping points’ being reached within less 
than ten years there may not be time for the type of radical politics that the Camp officially 
endorsed, and the perceived long and slow process of dismantling capitalism and replacing it 
with a more equitable system. Whilst some argued that the state’s systemic function is to protect 
capital accumulation and that this is in fundamental contradiction to sustainable development, 
others argued that, given time constraints, the only ‘realistic choice’ was to encourage the state to 
enforce carbon reductions. According to this position, the goal of a more egalitarian society free 
from government control would have to be postponed until the problem of climate change is 
solved.  
As actors in a post-political society that condemns ideological debate to the fringes and 
favours the administration of ‘technical’ problems, the CCA participants’ practical political 
programmes did often not go beyond a commitment to tackling climate change. Behind much of 
the rhetoric emblazoned on the banners and publicity material, knowledge claims were rarely 
based on political values. Much of the campaign strategy became a focus on greenhouse gas 
emissions, largely abstracted from the social and economic conditions in which they were 
produced. Whilst the Camp was clearly an attempt at developing an antagonistic climate change 
politics, we must recognise the difficulties that it faced in attempting to realise this goal whilst 
operating both within and against the post-political climate consensus. Indeed, the history of 
Climate Camp can be read as a struggle between more radical positions focused on capital and 
positions influenced by wider social actors that derive their strategies to tackle climate change 
from official climate science. 
 
Climate action and science 
 
There is something very specific, of course, to the campaigning against climate change: that is 
the relationship of activism to science. In the official discourse, science can serve to further 
technocratic, consensual, and hence post-political, approaches to tackling global warming. 
Science is, as Ulrich Beck observed, “frequently implicated as cause, medium of definition and 
source of solution to the environmental crisis” (Beck 1992, p. 155). Unlike most environmental 
problems which attract protest, it would be impossible to understand climate change as anything 
other than a localised and causally ambiguous phenomenon without a huge scientific 
infrastructure such as is available only to the governments and research organisations of the 
industrialised world. Climate science has concurrently had a major effect on environmental 
movements which address the issue, with carbon-counting coming to shape political debates and 
strategies in ways which will be explored below.
1
 
First though, we shall examine academic discussions about the relationship between 
climate science and climate policy, where perennial debates over the role of scientists in policy 
making have been particularly fraught. There has been a widespread expectation that climate 
change policy should be ‘science-driven’, with solutions following rationally from shared 
acknowledgement of facts (King 2005, Soroos 2004). However, climate science is an exemplar 
of what Jerome Ravetz calls “post-normal” science, where “typically facts are uncertain, values 
in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent”, and as such invites conflict (Ravetz 2004, p. 349). 
A variety of actors have sought to advance different policy agendas through claims to holding a 
correct interpretation of ‘the science’. Most notably, the US Republican Party and oil industry 
                                                          
1 A close relationship between environmental protest and science is of course nothing new, with most previous 
environmental protests involving a heavy emphasis on science communication (Yearley 1996 and 2008). However, 
a key difference, we argue, regarding climate protest is firstly the degree of reliance upon science, and secondly the 
manner in which protesters have attempted to bolster rather than undermine official scientific prognoses. Previous 
science-based environmental protests, such as around GM for example, instead predominately involved activists 
turning to dissident or non-mainstream scientists (Levidow 1999) 
allies have supported a small number of scientists questioning the existence of anthropogenic 
climate change (Oreskes and Conway 2010). 
Quandaries over which scientists to trust spurred the creation of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the 1980s, which every five years creates a report conveying 
a consensus scientific opinion on the causes, character and impacts of climate change, allowing 
parties with divergent political and economic interests to find the basis for commonly agreed 
solutions to climate change (Bolin 2007). The IPCC, however, has not been free from criticism. 
The University of East Anglia email scandal preceding the Copenhagen COP15 provided 
ammunition to critics who saw climate change as an exaggerated threat created by self-interested 
scientists excluding dissenting opinions through IPCC bureaucracy (Gagnier 2010).   
Besides the so-called ‘climate sceptics’, a range of academics have suggested ways in 
which climate policy and science might be more closely aligned than at present under the IPCC  
(Hulme 2010, Webster et al. 2011). Iterative and sequential policymaking processes in which the 
barriers at the interface between climate science and policy are diminished, it is suggested, would 
result in more frequent policy shifts as new scientific evidence emerges (Parson and Karwat 
2011, Weichselgartner and Kasperson 2010). 
Common to most discussions of how to create a better fit between climate science and 
policy is the assumption that scientific consensus could and should foster political consensus: 
that states would set aside political priorities and defer to the epistemic communities assembled 
around the issue of climate change to outline policy options (Haas 1992). As Latour has said, 
science in the political arena has been expected to “bring order to [society] with incontestable 
findings that will silence the endless chatter of the mob” (Latour 2004, p. 11) – expectations that 
much resonate with the post-political frameworks of consensus that we have outlined above. 
Correspondingly, there has been a tendency in climate policy discussions – from scientists and 
non-expert policymakers – to downplay scientific uncertainty relating to climate change 
(O’Reilly et al. 2011, Shackley and Wynne 1996). 
However, as Latour and others have observed (Beck 2009), the distinction between facts 
and values in the political arena frequently becomes blurred. Science never entirely replaces 
politics, but is frequently employed to conceal it. As Hulme points out, climate science has been 
used “to justify claims not merely about how the world is […] but about what is or is not 
desirable – about how the world should be” (Hulme 2009, p. 74). This leads not only to science 
itself becoming a source of disagreement, but also to a debasement of the political dimensions of 
climate policy debates. 
There is much common ground in the issues facing climate policymakers and the climate 
activists referred to here in their dealings with science. The CCA similarly sought to both inform 
its strategy and confer legitimacy on its actions through scientific evidence, and it has 
encountered similar problems in terms of where to draw the science-politics divide. There is a 
crucial distinction though. Policymakers may actively seek in science a means of making climate 
change a technical problem in which, for example, inequalities in wealth and power are largely 
irrelevant. For many radical climate protest groups, the politicisation of climate change is a 
raison d’être – at least in principle: their activity serves to highlight how imbalances in wealth 
and power are integral to the climate crisis. 
However, science came to be both shield and bludgeon for CCA activists, with 
significant consequences. This was most apparent in media performances when pitted against 
fossil fuel industry opponents. Questions over the purpose, efficacy and legitimacy of protesters’ 
actions were met with a barrage of statistics and official report titles. Rather than employing a 
unitary ‘climate science’ as suggested by ‘the science says…’ rhetoric, protesters selected 
particular intellectual figureheads based around a combination of their social prestige and 
political leanings. Most significant was the NASA climate scientist James Hanson, who claimed 
that “the democratic process doesn’t quite seem to be working” in terms of limiting emissions, 
and suggested “that young people, especially, should be doing whatever is necessary to block 
construction of dirty (no CCS) coal-fired power plants” (see Clark 2007, Adams 2009). His 
comments were repeatedly reproduced by direct action climate activists. One organisation linked 
to the CCA dubbed him “a cool Granddad”, saying “if you’re doing stuff [protests] around coal 
and want backup from the pre-eminent climate scientist in the world [sic.], maybe drop a few 
Hansen quotes into your press releases [and] legal defence” (The Coal Hole 2010). As with 
Hansen, the appropriation of Al Gore’s perceived authority became important to activists’ 
knowledge claims. His statement, “I can’t understand why there aren’t rings of young people 
blocking bulldozers and preventing them from constructing coal-fired power plants”, fitted 
perfectly with the Climate Camp’s and Greenpeace’s Kingsnorth campaign (Greenpeace UK 
2010). 
The use of scientific authority as a means of deflecting elite criticism often fed into an 
overt de-politicisation of strategy. Joss Garman, for instance, co-founder of the influential anti-
aviation direct action group Plane Stupid, responded to suggestions that climate change protests 
were tokenistic, by stating in The Guardian: 
 
They say the Sixties was the anti-war decade; the Seventies saw marches against racism 
at home and apartheid abroad; if it’s the Eighties it must be Ban the Bomb and Maggie 
Out; the Nineties was roads and anti-globalisation; and the Noughties, this decade, is 
about climate change. We’ll soon be on to something else, right? Wrong. [...] this isn’t 
about ideals so much as hard science [...]. We know how this story ends, but not because 
we’ve read obscure economic treatises or dense theories from Friedman and Hayek or 
Hobsbawm and Marx. We know because scientists are providing measurable objective 
evidence that the high-carbon economic model has an in-built self-destruct mechanism 
(Garman 2009). 
 
Through this scientisation of political strategy, carbon counting came to eclipse radical political 
imperatives which existed in the Climate Camps’ discursive space. 
Numerous examples bear this out. In the most remarkable, military air bases were 
targeted not because of their function, but because the function could be more energy efficient. A 
spokesperson stated that regardless of the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, “there is still the large 
amount of unnecessary flying. Often the planes will do ‘touch and goes’ [sic.] where they land 
and then take off several times. These are needless emissions of carbon dioxide” (CCA 2008b). 
In 2007, protestors blockaded the Department for Transport because of their failure to 
appreciate the significance of aviation to overall CO2 emission levels (CCA 2007a). In the same 
year, the staff of BAA, the UK’s largest airport owner, were locked in their offices with a pile of 
scientific reports thrown in by protesters wielding a ‘read the science’ banner (Plane Stupid 
2007). In 2009, the street in front of the London carbon exchange was occupied, the CCA 
announced, because carbon trading would “defy science” (CCA 2009). The location of the 
camps was also justified primarily by science. In 2006 Drax coal-fired power-station in 
Yorkshire was picked because it was the largest single point-source of CO2 emissions in the UK 
(CCA 2007b). In 2007, Heathrow airport was chosen firstly because “the effect of Heathrow’s 
planes on the climate is equivalent to 31 million tonnes of CO2 emissions per-year”, and 
secondly because aviation was the single fastest growing source of CO2 emissions in the UK 
(CCA 2007b). In 2008, Kingsnorth coal power station in Kent was chosen, “firstly because it 
emits 10 million tons CO2 a year”, and secondly to oppose the new station being built there, 
highlighting coal as the most carbon-intensive form of power generation (CCA 2008c). In 2010 
the CCA was located adjacent to the RBS headquarters in Edinburgh. In the initial publicity for 
the camp the bank’s £50 billion bail-out was briefly mentioned before discussing the main reason 
for the target: “[t]his bank is one of the world’s largest investor in oil, gas and coal” (CCA 2010). 
Fittingly, the main march of the 2007 camp left under the banner “we are armed only with peer-
reviewed science.” Behind, protesters carried pages of a Tyndall Centre report on aviation above 
their heads (Indymedia UK 2007). The moment encapsulated a key strength of the protest, but 
also a key weakness. Being “armed only with peer-reviewed science”, suggests a weak arsenal of 
political, economic and ethical arguments. Besides this science is, as the sociologist Steven 
Yearley (1992) asserts, an “unreliable friend” in the political arena. Actually-existing science is a 
messier affair than the enlightenment ideal. Truth claims are contingent, based on continual 
uncertainty, and subject to continual revision or refutation. As any rummage through its history 
shows, actually-existing science is frequently no less subject to social pressures than other 
human endeavours – an issue that has been painfully exposed  as the ‘climategate’ scandal has 
unfolded 
The scientised politics of climate change employed by the CCA in some of its literature 
and strategic decisions and in that of other associated protest groups meant a narrowing of 
political horizons. In order to more closely adhere to ‘the science’, arguments which did not rest 
upon the foundation of quantifiable evidence were discredited. Thus, rather than political goals 
being informed by science, compliance with science became the goal in itself.  
 
Climate action and ethics 
 
There has always been something cultural about the practices of environmental social 
movements, so a post-political element to their strategic outlook is maybe not that surprising. 
What binds the members of sub-political groups and movements is also a way of doing things, 
and an outlook on new forms of social behaviour and living. Paul Chatterton, a human 
geographer and climate activist, described the Camp for Climate Action as “not just about 
climate change; it is about people’s ability to manage their own lives. There is no off-the-shelf 
model for learning to live without relying on politicians and corporations” (cited in Readhead 
2007). Moral claims in social movements rest on the assumption that a change in collective 
behaviour, seen as the sum of individual actions, can result in a fundamental change in society. 
Here, the literature on collective behaviour and new social movements is insightful. Herbert 
Blumer, for example, has defined social movements not just in terms of their opposition to 
current politics and policies, but in terms of their attempts “to establish a new order of life”, 
motivated by the “wishes and hopes for a new scheme or system of living” (Blumer 1969, p. 99). 
The development of camaraderie in movements precedes ideological and political affinity and is 
a result of social interactions that produce new values, morals and meanings. Other authors 
acknowledging this stress the importance of communication, commonality and identity for 
movement mobilisation (Touraine 1981, Melucci 1986, 1996, Habermas 1987).  
As perceptive as such analyses might be, they are not without fundamental criticisms. 
There have always been engaged rejections of notions of collective action that are connected to 
lifestyle, identity and ethical behaviour. Some of the hardest hitting arguments were brought 
against French (student) militants by members of the Situationist International in the 1960s. 
Situationist writers denounced militancy as a form of sacrifice and martyrdom, and argued that 
the presumed scientific or political knowledge informing militant behaviour led to an analysis of 
the world which required leadership: the individual gains authority through proof of her moral 
lifestyle, assuming the position of an expert in revolutionary change. Raoul Vaneigem (1994, p. 
109) wrote of the “young leftist radicals”:  
     
They become militants, fetishising action because others are doing their thinking for 
them. Sacrifice seems to have an endless series of tricks up its sleeve. […] Great 
despisers of life that they are […] the partisans of absolute self-sacrifice […] their lives 
twisted by their monstrous asceticism. 
 
The Situationist analysis was not solely directed against lifestyle militancy, but was understood 
in the context of strong Maoist tendencies within the French student movement. Nonetheless, its 
critique has also featured in discussions within contemporary anti-capitalist movements (for 
example Andrew X. 1999). 
Ethical consumerism and asceticism are at the heart of today’s climate action movements, 
and various high-profile campaigns consciously seek change in personal consumption patterns 
rather than radical social change. The 10:10 campaign, for example, which has attracted support 
from corporations, public sector institutions and a long list of celebrities, suggests individuals 
and organisations should carry out a carbon audit and reduce their CO2 emissions by ten percent 
in one year (for a critique of the initiative’s a-political nature, see Dobson 2009). Journalist and 
environmental campaigner George Monbiot has gone so far as to use the platform at the CCA to 
call for a stronger regulatory state, pushed forward by ‘riots for austerity’; echoing his earlier 
proposal to put pressure on government to restrict consumption: “People don’t riot for austerity; 
they riot because they want more, not less. We have to riot for less” (cited in Mason 2004). In its 
most extreme – and increasingly polarised – version, the call to action against carbon takes the 
form of agitation not against consumerism but against people as polluters per se. The Optimum 
Population Trust, which benefits from the endorsement by prominent environmentalists such as 
Paul Ehrlich, Jonathan Porritt and David Attenborough, proposes an offset scheme by which 
carbon-intensive lifestyles in developed countries can be measured against the projected 
consumption of people in developing countries. Western consumers can thus pay to offset their 
emissions by funding family planning schemes in Asia or Africa (on the Optimum Population 
Trust see Lockhart 2009). With such campaigns, the foregrounding of a consensual, 
individualising politics of carbon successfully hides the concrete economic and political 
processes which had brought these issues into being. Antagonistic social movements, especially 
in the Global South, appear to concede political prominence to more universalising campaigns, 
with tendencies to divorce issues of human welfare from climate change (Catney and Doyle 
2011). These campaigns avoid creating political conflict and, rather, focus on points of 
consensus regarding individual behavioural change.  
 The argument for holding the 2007 CCA at Heathrow Airport, near the village of Sipson 
which would be destroyed by a third runway, was certainly viewed from a scientific perspective 
as we have argued above. Yet, it also carried a strong moral angle, which we see as derived from 
a post-political action framework. In the context of consumer flights, this entered the arena of 
individual behaviour, contrasting ‘ethical’ lifestyle decisions with ‘unethical’ ones. It was a 
compelling argument. Our consumer choices would directly impact on the lives of the Sipson 
villagers. More so than the other camps situated outside coal-fired power plants, this second 
CCA lay at the intersection of a moral denunciation of consumer behaviour and of a radical 
critique of power in society. Ethically, the arguments at the Heathrow camp were situated within 
the sphere of the individual. A prominent actor within the Camp’s organising process was the 
anti-aviation group Plane Stupid, which calls for an end to short haul flights by curbing demand 
through taxes and restrictions. Its action repertoire includes high profile stunts, often intended to 
attract media attention. They have invaded the taxiway of Stansted airport, climbed the roof of 
the Houses of Parliament, and thrown green custard at then business secretary Peter Mandelson. 
While Plane Stupid tends to be recognised as a direct action group, its protests have a strong 
focus on publicity generation. Moreover, it has distanced itself at times from other direct action 
activists who have coupled campaigning around particular issues with criticisms of capitalist 
society. One Plane Stupid activist explains:  
 
The problem with explicitly anti-capitalist movements is that they are slightly intangible 
to grasp. The media doesn’t know what to make of them, and usually jump at the first 
opportunity to smear them. The advantage of being single issue is that you can have 
clearly defined aims and proposed solutions that people can grasp, discuss and debate 
(Gillett 2008). 
 
Nonetheless, politically as well as personally, there are strong overlaps with the radical 
environmental direct action movement with anarchist leanings and specifically with the Climate 
Camp. 
The evocation of public guilt and moral outrage about flying habits did not constitute the 
prime objective for the Heathrow camp, however. CCA also sought to advance arguments 
against the unequal distribution of power in society as one of the root causes of climate change. 
The two sometimes sat uneasily together. From the start, there was a mixture of calls for a 
change in lifestyles and for political, collective action. The Camp’s aims as stated on its website 
at the time proclaimed: “Yes we need to change light bulbs and stop flying to Spain for the 
weekend, but we also need to act collectively” (CCA 2007c). Yet, publicly the message 
remained: ‘Fly less’. A prominent banner illustrated this with the slogan ‘Make Planes History’. 
A day of mass action did show the limitations of a moralistic position. With the national media 
anticipating a dramatic attempt to disrupt, or shut down, the operation of the airport, the camp 
plenum settled for the less controversial option of laying siege to BAA’s corporate offices. 
Individual passengers were not targeted.  
Despite this, some participants and camp organisers lamented that the focus on individual 
responsibility for battling runaway climate change overlooked a relationship that existed between 
the ecological and the social – i.e. between climate change and society’s collective decisions. 
Specifically, the emphasis on a personal reduction in carbon emissions was contested. For 
example, another banner at the camp read ‘Social Change not Lifestyle Change’, clearly making 
the case against the focus on change in individual consumer behaviour. One climate activist 
commented that 
 
the camp put major emphasis on lifestyle change, even though most passers by could tell 
us that it is impossible to live sustainably in today’s society. Compost toilets and grey 
water systems are not things that the majority of the general public can opt into, so what 
remained was the demand for them to opt out of other actions, such as flying. Hence, one 
message of the camp appeared to be a call to ‘riot for austerity’, in contrast to calls that 
have historically rallied mass movements around a desire for prosperity (Charsley 2007). 
 
Another participant, writing after the 2008 Kingsnorth camp put it like this: 
 
Carbon emissions became a hot topic, but in the context of the above, only as ‘footprints’ 
to feel guilty about. Indeed, some campers were hoping for this. On the Thursday 
morning, I had a discussion with an activist about his ambitions for what is being dubbed 
the ‘climate movement’. “To make a lot of people very guilty”, he replied. This emphasis 
on guilt as a precursor for individualistic lifestyle change is perhaps the very opposite of 
what many original organisers hoped for (Ford 2008). 
 
Despite our focus on debate and conflict, we do not want to overstate the tensions that existed 
within the Climate Camp process. Political disagreements were usually resolved through 
informal arrangements and seldom transcend into wider organisational and activist arenas. 
However, they do reveal that ethical and strategic guidelines for action were frequently based 
upon a consideration of climate science. Despite the radical conclusions drawn from these, a 
post-political framework of understanding clearly played a large role within the CCA and 
associated direct action campaigning. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We have made the argument that the CCA represents a space in which post-political perspectives 
compete with more explicit forms of political action. This contestation emerges at the confluence 
of governance as a society-wide process and the actual specifics of climate change as a 
movement issue. As such the scientific/post-political positions and their anti-systemic/political 
challenges do not stand on equal footing. Rather, social movements aiming to ‘politicise’ the 
issue of climate change face a post-political consensus that reduces it to a technical-
environmental problem. 
This article has argued that within the CCA, this ‘scientisation’ represents a departure 
from the knowledge claims of a previous generation of direct action environmentalists. 
Environmentalism has always been shaped by its twofold approach to science. On the one hand 
science provided the facts to explain the relationship of nature and society. On the other hand, 
the approach was shaped by an emphasis on post-materiality. Yet, the relationship of individual 
spirituality to nature allowed for an ethical framework unlike that dictated by scientific 
rationality. 
Therefore, the way that climate activism has at times taken a post-political turn also 
signals a change in the reception of scientific claims in moral terms. With climate scientists 
generally considered friend not foe, hard fact science now provides the climate action movement 
with the moral and ethical framework to inform collective action, but also to prescribe individual 
behaviour and personal responsibility. These shifts are however not universally accepted and are 
taking place in a contested space. As Saunders (2008) shows, environmental movements do not 
share one overarching identity but incorporate multiple group bonds and subsets of behaviour 
patterns. The CCA was such a contested space where various political generations and 
perspectives interacted. 
Nonetheless, within this space a distinct set of political co-ordinates have emerged, 
which, we believe, are not unproblematic. Whilst the embracing of scientific knowledge and 
expertise makes possible an intervention into national and international policy issues, it risks an 
over-reliance on elite structures of knowledge production that grassroots movements have little 
access to. The ‘fetishisation’ of carbon-counting that we have referred to throughout the article 
suggests that climate change can become viewed as a scientific problem outside of a social 
context; akin to elite discourses that seek technocratic, rather than social and political, solutions. 
If scientific knowledge becomes a replacement for political vision, issues of social justice and 
political emancipation risk being subsumed within an apocalyptic temporality in which politics 
must cede to consensual pragmatics. Finally, an appeal to individual action and consumer 
behaviour is likely to be recuperated within this logic and limits the range of collective 
repertoires available to activists. Again, moral action cannot be abstracted from its political 
context. 
There are wider inferences which can be drawn for social movements from this initial 
research. We see the trinity of science, politics and ethics/morals as useful starting points from 
which to investigate the basis for collective action more broadly. It is apparent that the 
knowledge claims put forward by social movements are dynamic and related to social and 
historical changes. We must assume that environmental movements in general, but also activism 
focused on other progressive issues, are continuously influenced by changing contestations and 
epistemologies. As we head deeper into environmental and socio-economic crisis the forms of 
contestation which social movements produce is crucial to the possibility of progressive social 
change.  
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